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1. INTRODUCTION
The best place to begin these comments is to say that I found
this to be a wonderful book – genuinely thrilling to read. It is a
challenge for me to find a contribution that hasn’t been already
advanced many times, since the core topics – reference to
abstract objects, say, or impredicativity, to choose two among
many – have received so much intense attention in recent dec-
ades. I’ll try not to just repeat arguments that I already know
are in the literature. Also, since many other people are in a
better position than I am to comment on the technical side of
the general theory of abstraction, I’ll refrain from comment,
except to indicate my enthusiasm. Looking to a general account
rather than remaining content with ad hoc justifications of this
or that abstraction principle is clearly a crucial step to under-
standing the issues. Finally, I’ll have little that is critical to say,
because I’m in broad agreement with those of the central
reflections in The Limits of Abstraction on which I may have
something novel to contribute.1
I am most interested in learning how the work in the book
can be pushed forward to address further questions. I’ll put
those questions on the table and inquire about the relations of
these questions to the doctrines of The Limits of Abstraction,
and the promised extension via ‘‘procedural postulationism’’,
supplemented perhaps by the author’s other research into def-
inition and essence. In particular, I hope to learn whether and
how these doctrines might shed light on striking and puzzling
cases in non-foundational mathematical practice where finding
the right definition is a significant theoretical objective.
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(To facilitate the connection between the mathematical cases
and the issues at hand, I’ll consider in section II some cases
salient to Frege in the nineteenth century, but the point holds
for present mathematical practice as well.) To this end I’m
asking for clarification of various tantalizing doctrines whose
explanation is sufficiently compressed that many interesting
directions lie open, depending on how the terse exposition is
elaborated. Depending on how the condensed remarks are
spelled out, the doctrines implicit in the book (and in the
‘‘procedural postulationism’’ still to come) may be illuminating,
neutral or even in conflict with natural ways of reading some
aspects of mathematical practice that puzzle me. So I’m eager
to hear more. To put it colloquially, given my admiration for
the book and its author, my best strategy is to imitate the coach
of an exceptional athlete: point to the field, hand him the ball
and get out of the way.
I’m especially interested in development of the author’s
suggestion that in foundations of this kind it is typically not
enough that a definition be laid down; there also must be reason
to regard it as in some way or other distinguished. Even if we
can produce demonstrably equivalent definitions, we must be
able to make sense of the suggestion that this definition – and
not that one even if it is equivalent – really gets things right, or
captures the essence of the thing defined, or is, to use the old
terminology, a real rather than a nominal definition. I’m sym-
pathetic to the idea that some definitions are better than others
in broadly this way, though I’m also sensitive to the difficulty in
articulating an acceptable basis for distinguishing definitions
into real and nominal. One place in The Limits of Abstraction
where the idea shows up is in a preliminary discussion
(pp. 29–32) of the problem of arriving at a unique numerical
operator among the many that are available. Though the pro-
posal itself is set aside as a suggestion for defining the numbers,
this is not because of doubts about the idea that one definition
may better enshrine ‘‘the essential properties of numbering and
the numbers’’ (p. 29).
In the second section I’ll look to one place where we need to
make sense of people who speak of the ‘‘proper’’ definition a
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mathematical concept or object, or a definition that corres-
ponds to the essential features of the concept or object being
studied. Quite simply, as a simple descriptive observation about
ongoing mathematical investigation, one objective is to arrive
at a definition that – speaking loosely – ‘‘gets it right’’. I have in
mind remarks like these; the historical ideas mentioned will be
touched on again in section 2:
People who know only the happy ending of the story can hardly imagine the
state of affairs in complex analysis around 1850. The field of elliptic func-
tions had grown rapidly for a quarter of a century, although their most
fundamental property, double periodicity, had not been properly understood; it
had been discovered by Abel and Jacobi as an algebraic curiosity rather than
a topological necessity. The more the field expanded, the more was algo-
rithmic skill required to compensate for the lack of fundamental under-
standing . . . [Cauchy even came] to understand the periods of elliptic and
hyperelliptic integrals, although not the reason for their existence. There was
one thing he lacked: Riemann surfaces. (Freudenthal, (1975) p. 447
emphasis mine)
The fact that mathematicians speak this way and motivate
research accordingly needs philosophical clarification. Of
course, we can grant that in some circumstances mathemati-
cians set finding the ‘‘right’’ definition or fundamental property
as one among many research objectives, without adopting any
stance as to whether or not that way of talking is philosophi-
cally tenable. All we need say to begin is that this is a way
mathematicians talk, and it is embedded in the practice in
systematic ways. The philosophical question is how seriously
we can take this way of talking and whether there is a philo-
sophically interesting connection to our studies of definition
both in the foundations of arithmetic and in general.
I’m hopeful that some clarity about this kind of methodo-
logical question can be attained by fleshing out ideas like that of
a definition encapsulating the essence of a concept rather than
turning on accidental features. But there is a complication: in a
range of interesting cases in mathematical practice, the dis-
covery of the ‘‘right’’ definition is a real discovery. The question
of what the right definition is might require profound investi-
gation to answer. A concept or object can be introduced and
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discussed for some time before the right way to get at it is
properly understood. Indeed, it might be that the definition or
devices by which a concept or object is introduced is set aside as
accidental, in favor of an equivalent definition in terms that
only were worked out later. This is exemplified by the case
mentioned in the above quote: ‘‘elliptic functions’’ were origi-
nally introduced as the inverse of certain kinds of integral.
Later it was discovered that elliptic functions have two periods.
That is, if F is an elliptic function, there will be complex
numbers x1 and x2 such that for any complex z, and any
integers m and n, F(z) ¼ F(z + mx1 + nx2). Later still, it was
recognized that this is a reasonable choice as a defining feature
of such functions, while the original definition in terms of the
inverse of an integral, though equivalent, is better seen as
accidental. Reflecting this, most textbooks today define ‘‘elliptic
function’’ as a (meromorphic) complex function with this
characteristic property. Individual functions are taken to be
determined by their periods, rather than by the integrals that
they are inverse to.
In many cases there is a principle of evidence for ‘‘getting it
right’’: if the new definition really is the correct one, then
adopting it should make investigation easier. It will facilitate
discovery and shed light on topics that were previously obscure.
(I’ll suggest in section 2 that this point is in fact implicit in
Frege’s discussion of the Caesar problem.) This raises a ques-
tion I’ll return to about the role of ‘‘real’’ definitions – or
‘‘capturing the essence’’ of a concept – as the author of The
Limits of Abstraction conceives these things: what do we gain if
we hit on the real definition rather than some accidentally
equivalent one? Do we gain some cognitive advantage for
subsequent investigation if we get things right?
Does the conception of real definition implicit in The Limits
of Abstraction have any room for such phenomena? Or is it
impossible – given the author’s understanding of definition –
for an object to be introduced, used and studied via one defi-
nition or tacit specification, while its real definition remains
unknown and even – until more is learned – not practically
knowable? (If so, then someone like me seeking a conceptual
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framework to use for this aspect of mathematical practice
should look elsewhere.) It would seem on the surface as if the
author must have room for something like this, if he is to
maintain that some abstraction principle can capture ‘‘the
essential properties of numbering and the numbers’’. Numbers
and numbering were both used in daily life and studied in
sophisticated mathematics long before abstraction principles
came explicitly on the scene. But this surface impression could
be misleading. Perhaps the concept of number introduced by
the abstraction principle is seen as some kind of replacement
for or explication of the na€ve conception of number, rather
than an analytical regimentation of it. Perhaps something else is
going on. So here it would be useful to have further clarification
of the relationship the author envisions between the regimented
presentation of ‘‘the essential properties of numbering and the
numbers’’ and both the prior practices of counting and the
ongoing mathematical studies that regimented presentation is
meant to undergird.
Some of the programmatic remarks about definitions in The
Limits of Abstraction are especially tantalizing because of a
further feature of the practice of seeking good definitions that
the definition of elliptic function exhibits. The appreciation of
what is essential about a concept or object can require a shift in
the domain of discourse. The original definition of elliptic
function makes sense if the functions are defined only on the
real numbers. But one of the periods will always be a non-real,
complex number. So to bring out the ‘‘fundamental property’’
the domain of definition has to be extended beyond the one
originally envisioned. Often we can’t make out the essential
features of a mathematical concept or object unless we define it
over the ‘‘proper’’ domain where such ‘‘proper domains’’ may
be extensions of the ones with reference to the concept or object
was originally introduced.2 As I’ll note in III, some of the
remarks the author makes in his preview of his method of
‘‘procedural postulationalism’’ are especially intriguing in this
connection.
It will help for orientation to have a simpler example,
though it has the disadvantage of being imagined rather than
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real. It will help avoid thorny issues if we make it a simple
explicit definition. Say we have managed to define number
somehow, and we’re interested in prime numbers. We have, of
course, a canonical definition: a natural number n is prime iff
its only positive integer factors are 1 and n. Now say that
someone solves the Riemann hypothesis, and other break-
throughs occur in our understanding of the Riemann zeta-
function, so that we can arrive at a complete understanding of
the distribution of prime numbers in the natural numbers. This
requires us to extend our structural understanding of the nat-
ural numbers: to exploit the zeta-function we have to see the
natural numbers as embedded in the complex numbers, a
structure which (let’s say for the sake of argument) is itself
constructed out of the integers. Now furthermore, let’s say that
once the underlying factors are laid bare, the prime numbers
turn out to have an astonishingly lawlike and regular distri-
bution, once the underlying mathematics is laid bare. Also, it
turns out that the prime numbers are the simplest example of a
structure exhibiting this sort of distribution, and the general
theory of these distributions becomes a core mathematical
discipline, with the result that from the point of view of the
best available mathematical theories, the sense of what should
be taken as a defining characteristic of a prime number chan-
ges: rather than being essentially divisible only by itself and
one, prime numbers are seen as essentially having the newly
discovered properties. The traditional definition, while still
useful for teaching elementary students, comes to be seen as
accidental and even a curiosity.
Obviously this story is fanciful in the extreme as a forecast of
the future of mathematics, but the question here is whether it is
coherent, relative to the understanding of definitions that is
implicit in The Limits of Abstraction. Can it be that we use a
concept, with both an accepted definition and a role in a range
of ongoing scientific investigations, in such a way that we can
discover later that the definition capturing the essence of the
concept is not the original definition but rather an equivalent
one that has virtues especially prized by the practice? Is it
possible that the rationale for this reformed understanding of
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the concept can coherently appeal to investigations that them-
selves appear to presuppose the concept?
One principle that seems at first sight to cut against this
possibility is what Limits of Abstraction calls ‘‘Limited
Access’’ (pp. 72–77). But this depends on how various quali-
fiers are unpacked. The principle holds that ‘‘the means by
which a contextually defined object is introduced into the
discourse provides essentially the only means by which it may
be identified. Thus if numbers are introduced by Hume’s law,
then any particular number must essentially be identified as
the number of a given concept. . .’’.(p. 76) This appears
restrictive, but the next few paragraphs contain a condensed
discussion of possible tenable variations that can arise,
depending on how ‘‘means’’ and ‘‘essentially’’ are to be cashed
out. The refinements include ‘‘in identifying a given contex-
tually defined object, we should allow ourselves to use what-
ever structural relations might be directly or indirectly
involved in formulating the definition’’ (p. 77) and the general
observation that ‘‘our access to abstract objects such as
numbers or sets or directions appears to be limited by the
structural relations with which they are naturally associated.’’
(p. 77) Obviously a great deal will depend on the further
elaboration of ‘‘naturally associated’’, ‘‘structural relations’’
‘‘directly or indirectly involved’’ and other charged expres-
sions in this compressed discussion. The treatment is so terse
that I’m not sure how the story will go, so some clarification
and development would be welcome.
Especially exciting in this regard is the gesture in the direc-
tion of the positive account to come (‘‘procedural postula-
tionism’’): ‘‘The basic idea behind this alternative approach is
that, instead of stipulating that certain statements are to be
true, one specifies certain procedures for extending the domain
to one in which the statements will in fact be true. . .[the legit-
imacy of these procedures] does not depend on the prior
knowledge that the objects which are to be introduced into the
domain already exist.’’ (p. 100) Once again, these words hold
out hope for an account of definition that will be subtle enough
to incorporate a wide range of phenomena displayed by the
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practice of seeking good definitions in ongoing mathematical
practice. So here too, we may hope that further development
will illuminate over a wider range than philosophical treatments
of definition tend to travel. I’ll return to this topic after putting
some orienting background in place.
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To flesh out the kind of question I hope clarification of the
principles of definition underwriting The Limits of Abstraction
will illuminate, it will help to give some thumbnail history.
(This section won’t refer directly to the The Limits of
Abstraction, but it is a necessary detour, as otherwise it will be
obscure why I think ideas like ‘‘essence’’ and ‘‘real definition’’
might come in handy for understanding mathematical practice
if the ideas are articulated thoroughly.) To short-circuit a
lengthy discussion of mathematical practice, I’ll consider the
way that some of Frege’s remarks in the core sections of
Grundlagen would have resonated with the mathematicians
around him. The practice of defining objects in ongoing
mathematics was an issue around Frege, and we can see it show
itself in the discussion of definition in Grundlagen. (It is the-
matically cleaner, that Frege’s discussion is colored by the
issues about mathematical definition I’ve been discussing, but it
isn’t absolutely essential. The central concern is the issues about
definition themselves.) Frege and his core mathematical audi-
ence would have seen several complications and ramifications
that we overlook today. (My point isn’t to give a scholarly
defense of these claims but rather to use them to illustrate some
issues that can arise for anyone worried about the role of def-
initions in mathematics.)
Here are a few framing details that I defend elsewhere – I’ll
presuppose them here.3
(a) Frege’s work in ‘‘ordinary’’ (non-foundational) mathe-
matics is concentrated in two areas: geometry and complex
analysis (with a special emphasis on the theory of elliptic
functions and integrals).
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(b) German complex analysis at the time exhibited a sharp di-
vide between the ‘‘computational’’ approach of Weierstrass,
and the ‘‘conceptual’’ Gottingen approach of Riemann.
(c) The adherents of the Riemann tradition included Frege’s
teachers and Dedekind. More generally, the evidence from
Frege’s teaching, research and context indicates that he was
immersed in the Riemann tradition and opposed to the
principles driving the Weierstrass approach.
Even with all the attention focused on sections 55–83 of
Grundlagen, I think we’ve missed at least one issue that would
have been salient for Frege’s readers and that Frege would have
expected his readers to recognize as lying behind his words.
A basic theme is one we’ve mentioned. It can be of the greatest
scientific importance, for the ongoing practice of mathematics
(and not just the rigorous foundation), to find the ‘‘right’’
definition of something. A subtheme is that there is generally
a payoff for doing this successfully: the definition will aid
in discovering new results, finding proofs, understanding what
is going on, etc. In a word, a successful definition is fruitful.
In this light, consider Grundlagen x67. Frege is responding to
a natural question: why not say that the things whose intro-
ductions are forced by the definition count as numbers (or in
this case directions), and nothing else does? Frege’s response
ties the presentation – independence of objects to the potential
for increasing knowledge through deductive reasoning.
x67 If we were to try saying: q is a direction if it is introduced by means of
the definition set out above, then we should be treating the way in which the
object q is introduced as a property of q, which it is not. . .[and a further
unacceptable consequence would be that:] All identities would then amount
simply to this, that whatever is given to us in the same way is to be reckoned
as the same. This, however, is a principle so obvious and so unfruitful as not to
be worth stating. We could not, in fact, draw from it any conclusion which was
not the same as one of our premises. Why is it, after all, that we are able to
make use of identities with such significant results in such diverse fields?
Surely it is rather because we are able to recognize something as the same
again even though it is given in a different way. (Frege, 1884/1953, p. 78–79
emphasis mine)
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Here Frege appears to be rejecting a weak version of Limited
Access: we are not allowed to treat the fact that an object was in
fact introduced in a certain way as a property of the object. We
should recall that although today mathematics has advanced to
the point that the introduction of objects with reference to some
equivalence relation is old hat, to Frege it was a relatively novel
device for defining direction (orientation, etc.); Frege would
have seen himself as exploring a new technique whose potential
wasn’t fully charted. Outside of geometry a high profile use of
this manoevre was in Dedekind’s reconstruction of Kummer’s
theory of ideal numbers. We’ll consider that, and the motiva-
tions for it, in a moment. First let’s remind ourselves of how
Frege regards the connection between his conception of fruitful
mathematical innovation and the Grundlagen conception of
‘‘extending knowledge’’. Frege remarks in Grundlagen #64 that
in the Hume principle ‘‘we carve up the content in a new way
and this yields us a new concept (p. 75).’’ These metaphors of
carving are marshaled (elsewhere in Grundlagen as well as in
other Fregean writings) to support the suggestion that logical
inferences exploiting the truly ‘‘fruitful definitions’’ (sometimes
‘‘fruitful concepts’’) actually extend knowledge. In Frege’s most
vivid expression of the point, he writes:
[Kant] seems to think of concepts as defined by giving a simple list of
characteristics in no special order; but of all ways of forming concepts, that
is one of the least fruitful. If we look through the definitions given in the
course of this book, we shall scarcely find one that is of this description. The
same is true of the really fruitful definitions in mathematics, such as that of
the continuity of a function. What we find in these is not a simple list of
characteristics; every element is intimately, I might almost say organically,
connected with the others... the more fruitful type of definition is a matter of
drawing boundary lines that were not previously given at all. . . The con-
clusions we draw from it extend our knowledge, and ought therefore, on
Kant’s view, to be regarded as synthetic; and yet they can be proved
by purely logical means, and are thus analytic. (Frege, 1884/1953, pp. 100–
101)
The logical structure of ‘‘recarving’’ is meant to fit with and
underwrite a methodological story about the concepts and
definitions that are especially fruitful in practice. Among other
things, the quantificational analysis is meant to explain how
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such definitions are especially natural, or as Frege puts it fig-
uratively in the above remarks: ‘‘every element is intimately, I
might almost say organically, connected with the others.’’
Frege stresses the point that he regards his foundational
effort as bound to address the concepts that are ‘‘most fruitful’’
as revealed in ongoing scientific practice. That is, an especially
salient target for a logical system is that it must be able to
represent the fruitful concepts, as discovered in ‘‘scientific
workshops: logic’s true field of observation’’:
All these concepts have been developed in science and have proved their
fruitfulness. For this reason what we may discover in them has a far higher
claim on our attention than anything that our everyday trains of thought
might offer. For fruitfulness is the acid test of concepts, and the scientific
workshop is logic’s genuine field of observation. (Frege, 1882/1979 p. 33)
To understand how Frege would have expected these words to
resonate with his audience – at least the mathematically
informed readers – we need to look to the work that dominated
his environment. Around Frege, by those who worked in the
stream of research Frege did, it was believed (rightly as we can
see in retrospect) that a revolution in mathematical method was
implicit in Riemann’s methods for complex analysis. The par-
ticular feature of Riemann’s approach to complex function
theory that is relevant here is the specific way it sought the
‘‘right’’ definition of key functions and objects. Dedekind sums
up the attitude vividly in the following remarks. He represents
his approach – inspired by his teacher Riemann – as pushed
forward by an emphasis on ‘‘the internal rather than the
external’’:
[Gauss remarks in the Disquisitiones Arithmeticae]: ‘‘But neither [Waring
nor Wilson] was able to prove the theorem, and Waring confessed that the
demonstration was made more difficult by the fact that no notation can be
devised to express a prime number. But in our opinion truths of this kind
ought to be drawn out of notions not out of notations.’’ In these last words
lies, if they are taken in the most general sense, the statement of a great
scientific thought: the decision for the internal in contrast to the external.
This contrast also recurs in mathematics in almost all areas; [For example]
(complex) function theory, and Riemann’s definition of functions through
internal characteristic qualities, from which the external forms of
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representation flow with necessity. [Dedekind continues, in paraphrase: The
contrast also comes up in ideal theory, and so I am trying here to put down
a definitive formulation.] (Dedekind, 1895, pp. 54–55)
Of course, the philosophical problem of articulating the differ-
ence between ‘‘fundamental characteristics’’ that allow you to
‘‘predict the results of calculation’’ and ‘‘forms of representa-
tion which should be results, not tools, of the theory’’ is thorny.
But the remark was nonetheless fairly transparent at the time,
since the specific examples and methods Dedekind is alluding to
were well-recognized. Indeed, Dedekind is deploying catch-
phrases that were so common among those in the Riemann
stream as to be clichéd. Though the contrast of ‘‘internal’’ and
‘‘external’’ was not explicitly philosophically articulated, every
mathematically literate reader knew exactly what Dedekind was
getting at, and could name a long list of canonical examples.
One example is especially interesting here. Dedekind explicitly
links the Riemann stance with his version of an answer to the
‘‘Caesar problem’’: his reformulation of Kummer’s ideal theory
in a representation – independent way. Dedekind has just
presented a Kummer-style theory of divisibility of ideals he
regards as not wholly inadequate, but which he nonetheless
rejects.
One notices, in fact, that the proofs of the most important propositions
depend on the representation of an ideal by the expression [ma, m(b + h)]
and on the effective realization of multiplication, that is on a calculus . . .If
we want to treat fields of arbitrary degree in the same way, then we shall run
into great difficulties, perhaps insurmountable ones. Even if there were such
a theory, based on calculation, it still would not be of the highest degree of
perfection, in my opinion. It is preferable, as in the modern theory of
[complex] functions to seek proofs based immediately on fundamental
characteristics, rather than on calculation, and indeed to construct the
theory in such a way that it is able to predict the results of calcula-
tion. . .Such is the goal I shall pursue in the chapters of this memoir that
follow. (Dedekind, 1877/1996, p. 102 italics in original, underscoring mine)
What sorts of reasons were given to justify claims that some
definition or other was based ‘‘on fundamental characteristics’’
instead of ‘‘externals’’? It would be disappointing if the only
justification Riemann, Dedekind et al could provide took the
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form of some brute, inarticulate and unarticulatable aesthetic
response, as if ‘‘being the right definition’’ were grounded in
nothing more than ‘‘powerfully seeming to be the right defini-
tion’’. In fact, the reasons were subtle and various. I’ll note just
one here: it was seen as evidence that a definition got things
right if it was fruitful.
Riemann used a particular turn of phrase to make this point:
he spoke of his most significant definitions as making it possible
to ‘‘see practically without computing’’ results which had
required ‘‘tiresome computations’’. These improvements in
evidentness brought out by a proper definition were expected to
be systematic: the proper definition should make a range of
interesting problems easier, in the long haul. Dedekind is
echoing this rhetoric in the above quotes. Any mathematician
of his time would have recognized this, as these phrases too had
become clichés. As one illustration, even as late as 1899 a
textbook writer characterizes some strengths of the Riemann
approach with a string of buzzwords and catch – phrases, some
of which we’ve just seen:
. . .the synthetic treatment of analytic problems which builds up the
expression for the functions and integrals solely on the basis of their char-
acteristic properties and nearly without computing from the given element
and thereby guarantees a multifaceted view into the nature of the problem and
the variety of its solutions. (Stahl, 1899, p. III emphasis mine)
For the issues we’re discussing, it’s especially interesting where
Dedekind takes this. We began the section with a quote in
which Dedekind relates his assessment of Riemann’s method-
ology to his effort to recast Kummer’s theory of ideal numbers
extending a given structure. The main point of the ideal num-
bers is to provide extra numbers that will divide the numbers in
the original structure (with this division having desired prop-
erties). Kummer, though, doesn’t tell you how to decide whe-
ther a given object is an ideal number; he only says how things
that are given as ideal numbers behave. (For example: his rules
tell you – if you are handed two ideal numbers, identified as
such – what the sum of those numbers will be.) Dedekind, in his
recasting, introduces an equivalence class (an ‘‘ideal’’) of things
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in the original domain that are divided by a given ideal number,
with the rules for manipulating ideal numbers derived from the
properties of the explicitly presented ideals:
. . ..Since a characteristic property serves to define, not an ideal number,
itself, but only the divisibility of the numbers in o by the ideal number, one is
naturally led to consider the set a of all numbers a of the domain o which are
divisible by a particular ideal number. I call such a system an ideal for short,
so that to each particular ideal number there corresponds a particular ideal
a. (Dedekind, 1877/1996, p. 58 italics in original)
This brings us full circle: implicitly in the case of Frege (or so
I’m suggesting) and explicitly for Dedekind, the Caesar prob-
lem is bound up with a family of subtle questions about the role
of definition in non-foundational mathematical research as well
as philosophical foundations.
3. ‘‘PROCEDURAL POSTULATIONISM’’ AND ESSENCE AGAIN
It’s smoother for exposition to present these 19 century exam-
ples, but the point holds for contemporary mathematics as well.
(Of course, there is a lot of context-sensitivity, and variation
along subfields, and so forth, and mathematicians today are
typically less explicit than Riemann and Dedekind about the
implicit methodology, but these features of ongoing mathe-
matical practice are no less real and in need of philosophical
attention and clarity for all that.) In these closing remarks I’ll
be more specific about some of the things I hope/believe can be
illuminated as some of the more compressed parts of Limits of
Abstraction are unfolded.
So let’s return to the brief characterization of ‘‘procedural
postulationism’’. ‘‘The basic idea behind this alternative
approach is that, instead of stipulating that certain statements
are to be true, one specifies certain procedures for extending the
domain to one in which the statements will in fact be true. . .
[the legitimacy of these procedures] does not depend on the
prior knowledge that the objects which are to be introduced
into the domain already exist.’’ (p. 100) Unless further elabo-
ration corrects my impression, it seems to me that this will lay
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the groundwork for philosophically framing a technique that is
ubiquitous in mathematical practice, though it is not philo-
sophically well understood: making desired statements true by
extending the domain so that the statements do come true. You
want equations to split into linear factors? Extend the reals with
i. You want every pair of lines to intersect, and equations of
degree m and n to intersect in exactly mn places? Extend the
underlying plane with points at infinity (and be careful to count
intersections properly). This shows up when global features of a
domain are at issue too: you want the surface to be compact?
Extend it with a point (one-point compactification) or if you
want to preserve more nice properties extend it in a more
involved way (Stone-čech compactification). Can we go further
and give a philosophical scaffold for the idea that in many cases
these extensions provide the ‘‘right context’’ for the study of the
given theory? Can we give a philosophical account of what
could be meant when the essential properties of these objects,
or the proper definitions of them, can be arrived at by
exploiting such extensions? (Both in cases where finding the
essential properties or proper definitions is taken to require the
expansion of a domain, and in other cases where the domain
remains fixed.) As mentioned, much will depend on how the
compressed remarks cited in I are developed.
The author’s discussions of his preference for a predicative
account do leave it unclear how much room there could be for
the possibility that a real definition could be a later introduc-
tion, superseding the definition by which the concept or object
was originally introduced. Is it possible, given how the author
understands these matters, for a concept or object to be
introduced or defined in a context where there is also an
implicit methodology that determines some other, subsequently
discovered definition as the one that really captures the essence
of what is introduced or defined? How important is it to
our specification of the essential properties of a concept or
object that we in fact introduce the concept a certain way, or
even that we must introduce it a certain way? (The essence-
capturing definition may be implicitly determined by something
like a Ramsey sentence, with further investigation required to
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ascertain what best satisfies it.) Does the author’s vision have
room for definitions that introduce a concept or object, but
which ultimately serve only as ladders to be kicked away
(required by the human condition or the logocentric predica-
ment, perhaps, but not by the nature of what is defined)?
Another question that naturally arises is just what we are to
take as evidence that we have found the essence, or the real
definition, or what have you. As I’ve noted, a core piece of the
background methodology for Riemann and followers was that
finding the right definition should make things easier: it will
bring new things to light, and render relatively evident matters
that had previously been obscure or drowning in computations.
Can we say anything analogous on the conception of definition
setting the backdrop for The Limits of Abstraction? Are there
any characteristic marks by which we can recognize the real
definition when we happen upon it? Can we say anything
general, or will we have to rest with a different ad hoc rationale
for each separate case? Is there anything we gain by working
with the real definition rather than a nominal one, or is pos-
sessing and using the real definition something which may well
be inert as far as fruitfulness for further investigation is con-
cerned? Will arriving at the real definition have any effect at all
on the progress of the practice of (say) number theory?
This may give a sense of a few of the reasons why I find The
Limits of Abstraction exciting. The crafting, choice and use of
definitions in ordinary mathematical practice is far more
involved and complicated than philosophical theories of defi-
nition have had room for, except perhaps medieval theories
that today strike us as begging more questions than they an-
swer. The views articulated in the book, and even more those
that are presupposed or sketched out for future development
have the potential to give a great step forward in our under-
standing of a neglected range of questions arising from ordin-
ary mathematical practice. Depending on how the compressed
discussions noted in I are unpacked, we have the potential for
an account that will shed light on these phenomena or (almost
as good) will conflict with the na€ve interpretation of the phe-
nomena in a way that can promote deeper understanding.
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Having indicated a few places where the compressed dis-
cussion calls out for further development, and having indicated
some questions that I hope such further development might
engage, I’ll get out of the way.
NOTES
1 This is not to say I agree across the board, only that those disagreements I
have – on impredicativity, for example – are for reasons that are completely
unoriginal.
2 A further example – especially relevant here since it was both salient to
Frege and involves the definition of ‘‘direction of a line’’ (in the guise of
‘‘point at infinity’’) – is ‘‘conic section’’. The traditional definition in terms of
slices of cones, and even the definition in terms of the degree of the equation
(second) in ordinary Cartesian coordinates fail to bring out the underlying
unity of the concept, and complicate many of the central results. Currently
it’s accepted that the natural context for the study of conic sections is the
projective plane (the ordinary plane augmented with a point at infinity for
every class of parallel lines) and the natural analytic definition exploits the
corresponding homogeneous, rather than Cartesian coordinates.
3 See my (200x) and (200y).
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